The paper investigates the relationship between offshoring, wages, and the ease with which individuals' tasks can be offshored. Our analysis relates to recent theoretical contributions arguing that there is only a loose relationship between the suitability of a task for offshoring and the associated skill level. Accordingly, wage effects of offshoring can be very heterogeneous within skill groups. We test this hypothesis by combining micro-level information on wages and demographic and workplace characteristics as well as occupational infor-mation relating to the degree of offshorability with industry-level data on offshoring. Our main results suggest that in partial equilibrium, wage effects of offshoring are fairly modest but far from homogeneous and depend significantly on the extent to which the respective task requires personal interaction or can be described as non-routine. When allowing for cross-industry movement of workers, i.e., looking at a situation closer to general equilibrium, the magnitude of the wage effects of offshoring becomes substantial. Low-and mediumskilled workers experience significant wage cuts due to offshoring which, however, again strongly depend on the degree of personal interaction and non-routine content.
Introduction
Research on job tasks has become increasingly popular in recent years. This is reflected in the labor economics literature by, for example, Autor et al. (2003) , Spitz-Oener (2006) and Gathmann and Schönberg (2010) . In the international trade literature, the concept of tasks has also entered into the debate on international outsourcing or offshoring. For example, Blinder (2006) argues that certain tasks that are interactive, i.e., require face-to-face contact are unlikely to be offshored (e.g., hairdressers, lawyers) while tasks without these characteristics may easily be moved abroad (e.g., computer programmers). Levy and Murnane (2004) and Leamer and Storper (2001) also highlight the differences between what may be called routine and non-routine tasks, with the latter being less likely to be moved abroad. Grossmann and Rossi-Hansberg's (2008) influential paper picks up this thread, proposing a theoretical model that essentially redefines offshoring as trade in tasks rather than in the common meaning of trade in intermediate products.
What is clear from the earlier literature and also from the empirical work presented in this paper is that tasks are not synonymous with skills. While there may be some overlap, non-routine or more interactive tasks are not necessarily identical with higher educational attainment. This is an important point that has strong implications for the potential labor market effects of offshoring.
Traditionally, the literature has concluded that offshoring from industrialized countries has led to a shift in labor demand towards more skilled workers, implying that unskilled workers lose while skilled workers gain from this form of globalization (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson, 2001) . However, when considering tasks as well as skills, the conclusions change. This is what we show in this paper.
By using very rich individual-level panel data, we are able to assess in detail wages, skill levels, and the nature of the tasks performed by individuals in their jobs. This is combined with data on offshoring activities of the industry. We use this data to empirically model the impact of offshoring on wages, and focus on how the wage effect of offshoring is simultaneously determined by the skill levels and tasks carried out by individuals. Thus, we study the interaction between skill levels and tasks and investigate whether within skill groups, the nature of tasks carried out by an individual determines the effects of offshoring on 3 wages. As Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) have suggested, the effects of offshoring depend on the cost of trading tasks, which may differ across different types of tasks. Hence, our working hypothesis is that, in the absence of a oneto-one relationship between tasks and skills, the interaction of the two variables matters. Our empirical results support this hypothesis.
We use two strategies for identifying a link between offshoring and wages.
The first is to use within-industry changes in offshoring intensity and wages.
Here, we look only at changes in the wages of individuals staying in an industry, and not those that occur due to an individual moving from one industry to another as a consequence of offshoring. This makes our analysis essentially a short-run, partial equilibrium analysis.
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The second identification strategy is based on the idea that, in general equilibrium, individual i's wage is determined not only by offshoring activity in the industry in which i is employed, but also by what is going on in other industries.
Specifically, the wages of i holding occupation k will, in general equilibrium, depend on offshoring activities affecting occupation k in any industry. Take, for example, electrical engineers working in the automobile and machinery industries. Offshoring an engineer's tasks in automobiles affects not only engineers in this industry, but also in the machinery industry, as engineers may move from automobiles into machinery and vice versa. Note, of course, that actual movement of workers is not required to generate these cross-industry effects: the potential for movement is sufficient.
In the growing literature on offshoring and tasks, we are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to explicitly investigate the interaction between tasks and skills in order to gauge the effect of offshoring of activities on wages.
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We look at the labor market effect of offshoring by examining individual-level wages rather than relative demand for labor at the firm or industry level.
3 This 1 This is a common assumption in the literature. It is, for example, implicit in the studies examining the relationship between relative labor demand and offshoring using aggregate industrylevel data (Feenstra and Hanson, 2001 ). Studies using individual-level data, such as Geishecker and Görg (2008) or Liu and Trefler (2008) are based on the same assumption.
2 The paper most closely related to ours is by Ebenstein et al. (2009) , who use micro data to define occupations as routine or non-routine. They do not consider possible interactions between tasks and skills, as suggested by other empirical work, however. Moreover, we expand on this paper by using not only the routine vs. non-routine distinction, but as an alternative approach, also classify occupations according to whether they are based on interactive vs. non-interactive tasks. In addition, Crinò (2010) looks at the impact of services offshoring on labour demand while differentiating between "tradable" and "non-tradable" occupations. Finally, Baumgarten (2009) uses micro data to investigate the relationship between offshoring, tasks, and employment stability.
3 Feenstra and Hanson (1996) is one of the standard references for such studies at the industry 4 allows us to take account of individual-level heterogeneity, controlling for a host of observable and unobservable effects at the individual and industry level, thereby avoiding aggregation bias.
4
Our empirical results show that wage effects of offshoring are heterogeneous between as well as within skill groups, depending on the degree of interactivity or non-routine content of the respective tasks of workers. Thus, the more traditional dichotomy between high-skilled and low-skilled workers does indeed need to be revised, taking the nature of tasks into account.
Another important finding is that the partial equilibrium effect, that is, the impact of offshoring in the individual's own industry, is quite low. However, when looking at the effects of offshoring in a situation that more closely corresponds to a general equilibrium setting-when allowing for worker mobility between industries-we find substantial wage effects that are economically highly significant.
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In the next section, we provide a brief review of the theoretical background that motivates our empirical analysis. We then give a detailed account of our data and the classification of tasks according to their degree of interactivity and non-routine content. Section 4 explains the empirical model and addresses potential caveats. Our partial equilibrium results are presented in Section 5, while Section 6 shows our estimates when allowing for cross-industry worker mobility. Section 7 concludes the analysis.
Theoretical Background
The theoretical model of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) can serve as a guide to motivate our empirical analysis. In their model, a firm produces output using a continuum of tasks that are performed by either low-skilled (L-tasks) or high-skilled (H-tasks) workers. These tasks can be carried out either at home or abroad. Offshoring tasks is costly, and these costs differ across tasks. Carrying level. Becker et al. (2009) analyze the link between tasks, skills, offshoring by multinationals, and relative labor demand at the firm level using German data. They estimate the relative demand for skills and tasks, respectively, applying the framework by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) . They do not, however, allow for a possible interaction between skills and tasks.
out tasks abroad may be advantageous due to factor cost differences, but these potential savings have to be weighed against the costs of offshoring.
In this setup, there are three types of effects on wages if offshoring costs for one set of tasks decline, that is, if offshoring of one set of tasks increases.
First, increased offshoring of a specific set of tasks raises the productivity of the factor that usually performs these tasks, and thereby generates a real wage increase for this factor. Second, there is a labor supply effect. The excess workers who have been freed up through offshoring have to be reabsorbed in the economy, which leads to a fall in the real wage for the factor that performs the offshored tasks. Third, there is a relative price effect, whereby the price of the final good that uses offshoring declines. This will, via the familiar StolperSamuelson effect, also negatively affect the wages of the workers that carry out the offshored task. In sum, the model predicts an ambiguous effect of increased offshoring depending on the relative strength of the positive productivity and negative factor supply and relative price effects.
Note that, for our empirical strategy, it is important to point out that the productivity and labor supply effects are elaborated in the Grossmann and Rossi-Hansberg model in a setting where they focus on a single sector with a fixed supply of low-and high-skilled workers. This scenario corresponds to a short-run view of the economy, where labor is immobile between industries, and thus to our first identification strategy, where we examine the impact of changes in within-industry offshoring on within-industry wages, abstracting from the mobility of labor across industries. These two effects also hold in general equilibrium, where the additional relative price effect also comes into play.
Rather than solely testing the model predictions for low-skilled and highskilled workers, we expand on the idea that different sets of tasks have different offshoring costs, which may be only loosely related to skills. Thus, we go beyond simply associating what Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg call "L-tasks" and "Htasks" with low-skilled and high-skilled workers. If it is indeed the case that, for example,"non-routine tasks" are less easily offshored (i.e., have higher costs of being offshored), as suggested in recent papers, then we would expect that, within the group of, say, low-skilled workers, the wage effects of offshoring should differ for those individuals carrying out non-routine tasks as compared to those who perform simple routine tasks. The same goes for high-skilled 6 workers. Our empirical results are in line with this contention.
Data and Methodology
The empirical strategy in this paper rests on combining individual-level data on wages and worker characteristics with more aggregate data on offshoring activity and other observable industry characteristics. To make the German Qualification and Career Survey sample comparable to the one used in our wage regression, we restrict the sample to males aged 18
6 Specifically, we use sample A-F of SOEP. The data was extracted using the add-on package PanelWhiz for Stata. Panelwhiz (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) was written by Dr. John P. Haisken DeNew (john@PanelWhiz.eu). See Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006) for details. The do-file generated by PanelWhiz to retrieve the data in the present paper is available from the authors upon request. Any data or computational errors in the paper are our own.
7 According to Frick and Grabka (2003) , the imputation procedure disregards industry-level information such as offshoring. As a result, the imputation of missing wage information compresses the wage distribution with respect to the industry-level variables that are of most interest for our analysis and is therefore not suitable for this application.
to 65, which leaves us with some 19,000 individuals (out of about 34,000). Our occupational grouping is based on the two-digit level of the KldB92, which is available in both data sets. Only in cases where occupational cells become too small do we switch to the next-highest level of aggregation.
9
The distinct advantage of this survey is that respondents not only state their occupation but also give a detailed account of the tasks they perform on the job and the associated work tools they use to do so. Using this detailed information, Becker et al. (2009) propose a mapping of tasks into occupations.
In a first step, each of the 81 surveyed tools and thereby each task is classified as (i) routine or non-routine and (ii) interactive or non-interactive, where the former grouping refers to non-repetitive tasks and the latter to tasks requiring interpersonal contact. For illustration, the use of an overhead projector or beamer is coded as both non-routine and interactive, whereas the opposite holds for computer-controlled machinery. Simple means of transport are an example of tools denoting an interactive but routine task, whereas precision-mechanical tools are coded as non-routine and non-interactive (see Table A1 in Appendix 1 for a list of surveyed tools and their respective classifications).
In a next step, the number of non-routine and of interactive tasks are averaged over occupations. Accordingly, a higher number implies a more intensive use of the associated task category.
Finally, for every occupation, a continuous task intensity measure in the range of 0 to 1-where 1 denotes maximum intensity -is derived by normalizing the figures by the maximum sum of non-routine and interactive tasks in any occupation. Thus, in compact form, the formula reads as follows:
where i denotes the occupation and j ∈ {non-routine, interactive} the task category.
To check the robustness of our results, we also use an alternative task classification which is based on a separate list of 13 job descriptions that is available in the same data set (see Table A2 in Appendix 1). It is the same set of questions that was first used by Spitz-Oener (2006) in her work on tasks, computerization, and technical change and subsequently employed by, for example, Borghans et al. (2008) and Gathmann and Schönberg (2010) . Whereas Spitz-Oener (2006) follows Autor et al. (2003) To what extent non-routine and interactive tasks and skills, measured in terms of educational attainment, are related is summarized in Table 1 . 11 As becomes apparent in the mean comparison tests, high-skilled workers on average have occupations with a significantly higher content of interactive as well as non-routine tasks. However, from Figures 1 and 2 it also becomes clear that although high-skilled workers indeed tend to have occupations with higher interactive and non-routine content than low-skilled workers, there is significant heterogeneity within skill groups. Thus, while higher skills and non-routine and more interactive tasks seem to be correlated, we can nevertheless identify lowskilled manufacturing workers that occupy positions that are highly interactive or non-routine and vice versa.
Among the low-skilled, a typical occupation characterized by low nonroutine content is "storekeeper, warehouse keeper" while "assemblers" is an example of an occupation with low interactivity. "metalworkers," the largest occupational group among low-skilled workers, score low in our interactivity index but are in the medium range of our non-routine indicator. On the other hand, "truck drivers" display a low intensity of non-routine tasks but have frequent interactions with co-workers or third parties.
"Technicians" are the largest occupational group among the medium-skilled.
They carry out a rather high proportion of both non-routine and interactive tasks. Whereas "production foremen" even surpass them in both dimensions, a typical occupation that displays considerably lower values is that of "office clerk".
"Engineers" make up by far the largest share among the high-skilled, followed by "managers". Both occupations are characterized by high degrees of non-routine and interactive tasks, which also explains the rather low standard deviation of the task indices for the group of the high-skilled. However, there is still heterogeneity. For example, "computer scientists" are characterized by a high non-routine content but are less intensive in interactive tasks.
The question for the econometric analysis is now whether workers with highly interactive or non-routine occupations are indeed differently affected by increased offshoring than their counterparts with occupations that have low interactivity and are fairly routine. To answer this question, we follow two identification strategies. The first is based on the assumption that workers'
wages are affected by offshoring activity in the industry in which the worker is employed, similar to, e.g., Feenstra and Hanson (1996) , Geishecker and Görg (2008) and Crinò (2010) .
In order to implement this strategy, we merge our individual-level data with industry-level offshoring measures. Offshoring is constructed by combining input-output tables for imports provided by the German Federal Statistical
Office with commodity trade data from the Eurostat Comext database. We follow a narrow concept of materials offshoring by focusing on imported intermediate inputs that correspond to a make-or-buy decision, that is, inputs that in principle could be produced by the importing industry itself (see Feenstra and Hanson, 1999) . We consider this offshoring measure to be more accurate than relying solely on affiliate employment (as in, e.g., Ebenstein et al., 2009) since i) affiliate employment also reflects horizontal MNE activities and ii) not all offshoring takes place through foreign direct investment. Formally we can denote offshoring as:
with IM P j * t denoting imported intermediate inputs from industry j * and Y jt the production value of industry j at time t. Ω jj * t denotes the share of imports from a foreign industry j * that is consumed by the respective domestic industry j in t with J j=1 Ω jj * t × IM P j * t =total imports from industry j * which are not only used in manufacturing but also in agriculture, services, private and public consumption, and investments and exports in t. 
Empirical Model
To assess the wage impact of offshoring conditional on observed and unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate variants of the following Mincer wage equation:
where W AGE ijt denotes individual i's hourly wage in industry j at time t.
Our controls include the standard variables in such wage regressions, see, for example, Mincer (1974) , Brown and Medoff (1989) , Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991) . Descriptive statistics on all control variables are provided in Table 2 .
DEM OG denotes the demographic control variables for marital status, children, and geographic region. 14 The second set of control variables (W ORK)
refers to workplace-related characteristics such as size and firm ownership as well as tenure.
We also control for time-changing observable industry characteristics (IN D) by including the size of the industry (measured in terms of output Y ) and equipment and plant capital intensity (Cap Equ,P lant /Y ).
To control for as much unobserved heterogeneity as possible, we make full use of the three dimensions, i, j, and t, in our panel data and decompose the error term into industry fixed effects τ j , time fixed effects µ t , individual fixed ef- 
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In addition, we control for the nature of job tasks of individuals by including our constructed interactivity and non-routine indices, respectively. We do this by interacting the respective task index with the educational attainment dummies, thereby allowing for heterogeneous task effects across skill groups (EDU C × T ASK). To account for the potentially heterogeneous impact of offshoring across skill groups and tasks, we interact offshoring with the educational dummies (OS × EDU C) and also include triple interaction terms for
offshoring (OS × EDU C × T ASK).
Accordingly, the marginal effect of offshoring for the different skill groups e can be denoted as:
We therefore allow for heterogeneous effects of offshoring within skill groups depending on the corresponding non-routine or interactivity index.
The combination of micro-level data and more aggregate offshoring information can overcome a number of problems that haunt pure industry-level studies.
First, due to the detailed information on educational attainment in our microdata, we can differentiate between skill groups in a much more precise way than the commonly used manual/non-manual worker dichotomy (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson 2001; Geishecker, 2006) .
Second, since individual wages must have a substantially higher variance than industry averages, potential endogeneity bias is considerably reduced, that is, individual wages are unlikely to affect industry-level aggregates such as offshoring (see Appendix 2). Nevertheless, we can also test for exogeneity of our offshoring measures using lagged values as instruments, and are unable to reject the H 0 of exogeneity within reasonable confidence bounds ( see Table A2 in Appendix 2).
16 Third, combining micro-level wage information and industry-level offshoring data results in a three-dimensional data set that allows us to control for industry technological progress by including industry-specific time trends. Arguably in our context, this is more general than to only include research and development or technology measures, sometimes of poor quality, as most studies do (e.g., Berman, Bound and Machin, 1998 , Feenstra and Hanson, 1996 , 1999 .
Combining micro-level and aggregate data can, however, give rise to contemporaneous correlation of the error terms ijt as demonstrated convincingly in, e.g., Moulton (1986) . As has become standard in the literature, we therefore calculate cluster-robust standard errors applying the sandwich formula proposed in White (1980) and Arellano (1987 However, individuals rarely change occupation and when they do they are more likely to choose occupations with a similar task content (see Gathmann and Schönberg, 2010 ) in order to minimize task-specific human capital losses. In our sample, only 445 occupation changes (of 13,189 observations) take place between 1991 and 2006. We therefore consider simultaneity between wages and tasks to be of lesser concern when looking at task-specific offshoring effects.
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Partial Equilibrium Results
We estimate various specifications of Equation 6 for different task groupings.
The main estimation results are presented in Table 3 for the interactivity task index and Table 4 for the non-routine task index following the methodology proposed by Becker et al. (2009) .
In the present analysis, we are of course mainly interested in the effects of offshoring and merely control for any observable and unobservable heterogeneity that may otherwise bias our results. Regarding the standard demographic and workplace-related control variables, coefficients are identified through time variation and generally have the expected sign and magnitude but, conditional on our comprehensive unobserved heterogeneity controls, often cannot be estimated with sufficient precision.
Note that pairs-cluster bootstrapped t-statistics performed for the specifications reported in Column (c) of Tables 3 and 4 always confirm the conventional cluster-robust t-tests or even point to statistical significance when conventional t-statistics do not. Thus, in our application, the number of clusters (industries) seems large enough to avoid the serious over-rejection problems discussed by various authors and summarized in Cameron et al. (2008) .
Focusing on statistically significant coefficients according to our pairs-cluster bootstrapped t-statistics in Tables 3 and 4 (Column IV), we find, ceteris paribus, that workers who change into firms with 20 to 199 and 200 to 2,000 employees experience wage cuts of four and two percent, respectively, compared to firms with more than 2,000 employees, our default category.
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Regarding tenure, we have to reject non-linearity and find a weakly statisti- Similarly, we find only a weakly significant direct wage effect with respect to the interactivity-based task index when interacted with medium skills, and no statistically significant direct wage effects with respect to the non-routine content of tasks. Again, this is likely due to the fact that individuals rarely change between different types of tasks. Conditional on our large set of controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, we can now look at the offshoring coefficients and their respective interaction terms. As expected, the effects of offshoring are fairly heterogeneous depending on individual skills but are also shaped by the ease with which different tasks can be offshored. To see this, however, one cannot rely solely on Tables 3 and 4 . To ease interpretation of the coefficients and to illustrate economic significance of offshoring for various skill and task interactions, we engage in a thought experiment and ask how much hourly wages would have increased or decreased had offshoring remained constant at its 1991 value. 22 We do this separately for low-, medium-, and high-skilled workers, and further distinguish between the types of tasks within skill groups by looking at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the respective interactivity and non-routine content of tasks. Table 6 presents the outcome of this exercise for our interactivity and non-routine content task classification, respectively. Bold figures represent simulations where coefficients on the skill-interacted offshoring measures and the triple interaction terms are jointly statistically significant.
Focusing first on low-skilled workers, variables and interaction terms that relate to offshoring are found to be jointly statistically significant for the interactivity as well as the non-routine content task classification. However, in line with the reasoning of Leamer and Storper (2001) , Levy and Murnane (2004), and Blinder (2006) , the effect of offshoring is heterogeneous within the group of low-skilled workers and indeed depends on the ease with which tasks can be offshored.
Applying the interactivity-based task classification, we find that had offshoring remained constant at its 1991 value, low-skilled workers in the lowest tenth percentile of interactivity, ceteris paribus, would have earned 32 euro cents (i.e., 2.17 percent of 1991 average low-skilled wages) more per hour in 2006 than they actually did. Low-skilled workers in the 50th percentile, however, only incur wage cuts of 10 euro cents, or 0.66 percent, while low-skilled workers in the 90th percentile experience small wage increases of 10 euro cents, or 0.65 percent.
When instead classifying offshorability along the lines of non-routine contents of tasks, we find very similar effects. Taken together, the cumulative effect of increased offshoring is a 26 euro cent (1.73 percent) reduction in hourly wages for low-skilled workers with the lowest content of non-routine tasks. Low-skilled workers in the 50th percentile of non-routine content only experience wage cuts 22 Note that to do so we assume that changes in offshoring intensity are essentially marginal.
of 12 euro cents (0.82 percent), while workers in the 90th percentile gain 15 euro cents (1.04 percent).
Clearly, these partial equilibrium effects seem fairly small at first glance. To signify the size of the effects, assuming 1,500 work hours per year, offshoring accounts for a 390 to 480 euro reduction in yearly gross wages (in constant 2000 prices) for low-skilled workers whose tasks are most easily offshored. However, low-skilled workers whose tasks are most difficult to offshore, that is, workers whose tasks are most interactive or have the highest non-routine content, are only positively affected by industry offshoring. Due to offshoring, their gross yearly income (in constant 2000 prices) increases by between 150 and 225 euros.
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For medium-skilled workers, coefficients are only estimated with sufficient precision when applying the interactivity-based task classification. Again, the partial equilibrium effects of offshoring follow a similar pattern as for low-skilled workers. Medium-skilled workers with the lowest degree of interactivity experience cumulative wage cuts of 38 euro cents (2.23 percent), while medium-skilled workers at the 50th and 90th percentile experience cumulative wage gains of 7 and 27 euro cents, respectively. For high-skilled workers, however, statistical significance has to be generally rejected.
To test for the robustness of our findings with respect to an alternative classification of tasks, we proceed by employing the methodology based on SpitzOener (2006), which is discussed in more detail in Section 3. For completeness, coefficient estimates of our main specification containing all interaction terms are reported in Table 5 for interactive and non-routine task indices, respectively. When looking at the F-tests for joint economic significance of our interaction terms and the respective economic significance calculations reported at the bottom of Table 6 , it becomes clear that the effects of offshoring are identified with considerably less precision when applying this alternative task classification scheme. However, at least for low-skilled workers, there are some striking similarities across the different task classification schemes. Following the methodology based on Spitz-Oener (2006), we find that low-skilled workers who carry out tasks with the lowest degree of interactivity and the lowest non-routine content experience cumulative wage cuts of 17 and 19 euro cents, respectively. Low-skilled workers in the 50th percentile of interactivity and nonroutine content, however, only experience wage cuts of 13 and 11 euro cents, respectively. At the same time, we find low-skilled workers in the 90th percentile of interactivity and non-routine content to gain 3 and 5 euro cents respectively.
These effects are, however, only at the border of conventional statistical significance when looking at the interactivity of tasks and only weakly statistically significant when focusing on the non-routine content of tasks.
Results with worker mobility across industries
We proceed by explicitly dropping the assumption that workers are immobile between industries, that is, we want to look at the effects of offshoring that are more closely related to the general equilibrium. As already discussed in Section 1, in general equilibrium, individual i's wages are not only determined by offshoring activity in the industry j in which i is employed, but also by offshoring activities in other industries l ∈ J, insofar as these activities affect the overall demand for labor that individual i faces. What is important is that no actual movement of workers is required to generate these cross-industry effects; the potential for movement suffices.
One way of approximating these wage effects of offshoring is to use occupation-specific measures of offshoring. Thus, we allow for cross-industry effects of offshoring by making the identifying assumption that workers are reluctant or unable to change occupation but readily switch between industries.
In order to implement this, we build on Ebenstein et al. (2009) and construct occupation-specific offshoring by re-weighting industry-level offshoring measures (cf. Equation 2) with respect to industry employment within a given occupation k as a share in total employment L within occupation k. tured by a full set of occupation dummies τ k . Since each occupation corresponds to exactly one time constant task intensity in our data, we have perfect collinearity between the two variable sets. Accordingly, our occupation dummies also capture the respective interactivity and non-routine content of associated tasks. Tables 7 and 8 As is reported in Table 10 , we find strong occupation-specific offshoring effects for low-and medium-skilled workers that vary significantly across different 20 degrees of interactivity or non-routine content of tasks.
Low-skilled workers in the 10th percentile of interactivity experience cumulated wage cuts of 1.31 euros (8.85 percent) per hour. For low-skilled workers in the 50th percentile of interactivity, this cumulated wage cut is 0.77 euros while low-skilled workers with the highest degree of interactivity only experience wage cuts of 0.29 euros. These wage effects are substantial and considerably larger than in the partial equilibrium case. Assuming 1,500 yearly work hours, low-skilled workers earn between 435 and 1,965 euros less due to offshoring depending on the degree of interactivity of the tasks they perform.
A similar pattern can be observed for medium-skilled workers. The cumulative wage cut due to offshoring is highest for workers in the lowest interactivity decile (1.64 euros) and becomes less severe the higher the degree of interactivity becomes (0.73 euros for the top decile). Again assuming 1,500 yearly work hours, we can calculate a cumulative wage reduction of 2,460 euros for medium-skilled workers in the lowest interactivity decile, 1,515 euros for the median interactivity degree, and 1,095 euro for the top interactivity decile.
Interestingly, these figures are robust irrespective of which task classification scheme is applied. When applying the task classification scheme by Becker et al.
(2009) but looking at the non-routine content of tasks instead of interactivity, we find very similar wage effects. Low-skilled workers in the bottom decile of non-routine content experience a cumulative hourly wage reduction of 1.06 euros, which is much more severe than the wage cut for low-skilled workers with tasks having a median non-routine content (0.83 euros) or a non-routine content in the top decile (0.35 euros). Again, for medium-skilled workers, the pattern looks similar. Here the cumulative hourly wage reduction ranges from 1.23 euros for the bottom non-routine decile to 0.72 euros in the top decile.
Furthermore, when applying a task classification scheme that builds on Spitz-Oener (2006) (see Table 9 for coefficient estimates), cumulative wage effects of offshoring are again very similar. For low-skilled workers, these wage cuts due to offshoring range between 1.06 euros per hour for the bottom decile of interactivity and 0.09 euros for the top decile. Applying this task classification scheme to medium-skilled workers, we find a cumulative hourly wage reduction of 1.56 euros for workers in the bottom decile of interactivity and 0.79 euros for workers with median interactivity. Medium-skilled workers at the top decile of interactivity, however, actually gain from offshoring: their hourly wages cumulatively increased by 0.20 euros. When focusing on the non-routine content of tasks, we find medium-skilled workers to experience wage cuts ranging between 1.63 euros and 0.08 euros depending on the degree of non-routine content.
Thus, in line with the argument put forward in, for example, Blinder (2006), a higher degree of interactivity or non-routine content can indeed shield against the negative wage impact of offshoring. However in the context of the model proposed by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) , the wage-reducing labor supply and terms-of-trade effects in most cases appear to dominate the positive productivity effect of offshoring for low-and medium-skilled workers in our data.
What is striking is the magnitude of the effects. While in partial equilibrium offshoring only modestly affects wages, albeit in an interesting task-specific way, the wage impact of offshoring is substantial once we allow for worker mobility and, thus, cross-industry spillovers.
Conclusion
The paper analyses the effects of offshoring on individual-level wages, taking into account the ease with which individuals' tasks can be offshored. Our analysis relates to contributions such as Blinder (2006), Levy and Murnane (2004) , and Leamer and Storper (2001) , who postulate that there is only a loose relationship between the suitability of a task for offshoring and the associated skill level. Instead, these authors stress that the degree of offshorability depends on the relative importance of routine versus non-routine tasks and on the extent to which personal interaction is needed on the job.
For the empirical analysis we combine individual-level data and industrylevel offshoring measures and classify tasks according to their degree of interactivity and non-routine content, applying two alternative classification schemes that build on Spitz-Oener (2006) and Becker et al. (2009) . By studying the effects of industry-level offshoring at the individual level we can control for a host of observable and unobservable individual characteristics, thereby avoiding aggregation and reducing potential endogeneity bias. The main contribution of the paper is, however, that by using micro-level data we can investigate the interaction between tasks and skills; thus, we can identify task-specific wage effects of offshoring within as well as between the groups of high-, medium-, and low-skilled workers.
In line with earlier research, we find the partial equilibrium impact of offshoring on individual wages to be rather modest and to vary according to individual skills. However, our empirical results also indicate that the partial equilibrium wage effects offshoring are heterogeneous within skill groups depending on the degree of interactivity or non-routine content of the respective tasks of workers.
When looking at the effects of offshoring in a situation that more closely corresponds to the general equilibrium, that is, when allowing for worker mobility between industries, we find substantial negative wage effects of offshoring for low-and medium-skilled workers. Furthermore, the magnitude of these effects strongly depends on the type of tasks workers perform. For instance, for lowskilled workers carrying out tasks with the lowest degree of interactivity (which, arguably, are also the tasks that can most easily be offshored), increased offshoring between 1991 and 2006 accounts for a cumulative yearly wage reduction of 1,965 euros. For low-skilled workers with the highest degree of interactivity, offshoring can only explain a yearly wage reduction of 435 euros. Accordingly, when studying the labor market effects of offshoring, we argue that the traditionally proposed skill-wage pattern needs to be altered by taking the varying degree of offshorability of tasks within skill groups into account. Material Offshoring Intensity in % 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 Note: *, **, significant at 10%, 5% error probability. Note: *, **, significant at 10%, 5% error probability. Default categories: D: Age 18-24, D: F irmSize >= 2000, D: ISCED Low-Skilled. All specifications contain individual fixed effects and full dummy sets for federal state, time and industry as well as industry specific linear time trends. Inverse sample probability weighted regression with cluster-robust standard errors. Note: *, **, significant at 10%, 5% error probability. Default categories: D: Age 18-24, D: F irmSize >= 2000, D: ISCED Low-Skilled. All specifications contain individual fixed effects and full dummy sets for federal state, time and industry as well as industry specific linear time trends. Inverse sample probability weighted regression with cluster-robust standard errors. Note: *, **, significant at 10%, 5% error probability. Default categories: D: Age 18-24, D: F irmSize >= 2000, D: ISCED Low-Skilled. All specifications contain individual fixed effects and full dummy sets for occupation, federal state and time as well as occupation specific linear time trends. Inverse sample probability weighted regression with cluster-robust standard errors. Note: *, **, significant at 10%, 5% error probability. Default categories: D: Age 18-24, D: F irmSize >= 2000, D: ISCED Low-Skilled. All specifications contain individual fixed effects and full dummy sets for federal state, occupation and time as well as occupation specific linear time trends. Inverse sample probability weighted regression with cluster-robust standard errors. Note: *, **, significant at 10%, 5% error probability. Default categories: D: Age 18-24, D: F irmSize >= 2000, D: ISCED Low-Skilled. All specifications contain individual fixed effects and full dummy sets for federal state, occupation and time as well as occupation specific linear time trends. Inverse sample probability weighted regression with cluster-robust standard errors. Note: Bold figures correspond to jointly significant offshoring/interaction terms.
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